New Government Watchdog for Tampa?

I had the honor of serving as Councilwoman Lynn Hurtak’s appointee to Tampa’s Charter Review Advisory Commission. I learned a lot over the nine months or so the commission considered various changes to the city’s charter. The purpose of this and future articles in this charter review series is to share some of what I’ve learned with the public. My goal is not to persuade the reader, but to provide insight to future voters on the issues we discussed.

Every eight years Tampa’s city council and mayor appoint a commission to review the city’s charter — the legal document that shapes the fundamental workings of Tampa’s city government. That commission completed its report earlier this month. On Thursday the council will hold the first of two meetings to consider the commission’s suggested changes, the boldest being the creation of a new office: the Office of Inspector General.

I happen to support establishing an Office of Inspector General. Here is some of what I’ve learned about how they work and where they are found.

Fundamentally, inspectors general (or IGs for short) are independent watchdogs. They oversee operations to sniff out waste, fraud, and abuse. IGs show up in all kinds of organizations all over the world, including here in Florida. According to the Florida Inspectors General website, the state’s inspector general community comprises “over seventy offices at the state, university, and local entity level.” At the local level, IGs operate in counties, cities, school boards, and clerk of court offices.

In 2010 Broward and Palm Beach counties became the first local governments in Florida to codify an IG position in their charters. Since then Miami-Dade County and the cities of Miami, Miami Beach, Doral, Tallahassee, and Jacksonville have followed suit. In all these local governments IGs have the power to investigate, audit, issue subpoenas, and otherwise access a sweeping range of materials a government may produce. (For reference, see the “authority” and “powers” sections from the Association of Inspectors General draft model legislation and links to the local governments’ IG legal code in the appendix).

Each of these cities and counties, with the exception of Doral, expressly specifies that their IG has the authority to pursue investigations on their own initiative, giving them power to look into matters without a prerequisite complaint. Doral’s ordinance states the IG has the power to review and investigate written complaints, but is otherwise silent on the matter of initiative. After completing an investigation, an IG may issue a public report on their findings, recommend corrective action, and monitor for compliance. They may also refer findings to law enforcement, ethics commissions, human resources departments, or other bodies as appropriate.

Typically, a special committee is involved in selecting an IG for a Florida city or county, though the composition of these committees varies widely and alternate designees are a common allowance. The committee usually includes the local state attorney and public defender. Law school deans, leaders of legal and law enforcement organizations, the chief judge, and a League of Cities representative also appear in the mix. Some committees include the city attorney, mayor, or city council members, though the Association of Inspectors General disapproves of this. In a recently released public letter to the Miami-Dade Board of County Commissioners, the association warned of an “inherent conflict of interests” in seating anyone on the selection committee who is directly subject to the IG’s oversight.

The way IGs are funded also varies by location. In Tallahassee and Jacksonville the budget for the IG is carved from the general fund. In some cases a funding minimum is guaranteed. In South Florida the law provides a budgetary safeguard against politically-motivated discretionary funding with a 0.25% fee on revenue from specific kinds of contracts, combining this buffer with an amount appropriated from the general fund.

In all but one of the cities with an IG in their charter, the IG has replaced the internal auditor, has subsumed the internal audit department into the IG’s office, or the IG otherwise performs all auditing functions in the absence of a prior internal auditor for the city. Jacksonville is the outlier. There, Jacksonville’s IG has broad auditing power, while a financial and management analysis auditing function also falls under the purview of the city council. Jacksonville’s IG works in conjunction with the Council Auditor when needed.

The proposition of establishing an IG may have elicited more differing perspectives and firmer convictions than any other topic Tampa’s Charter Review Advisory Commission discussed, but in the end, the commission recommended establishing an Office of Inspector General in their final report.

In the commission’s proposal the IG can initiate an investigation, audit, or review only upon a written request, differentiating it from other locations where the IG pursues these on their own initiative. The commission recommended that the IG have the discretion to issue subpoenas for interviews, but is forbidden from issuing subpoenas for records. The IG must file a public records request for those. This presents a unique distinction compared to other IGs with greater latitude to subpoena materials. The commission’s IG would have the power to refer matters to appropriate authorities and publish public reports of its findings, consistent with common practice.

As in other places, the commission recommended a special committee for the selection of Tampa’s IG. The composition largely aligns with committees elsewhere, and includes the state attorney, public defender, chief judge, ethics commission chair, academic and legal leaders, and elected officials (or their designees). The commission left open the possibility that the IG be retained individually or through a firm on a negotiated contract basis. Unlike in most other cities where the IG’s office has replaced or absorbed the internal auditor, the commission specifically protected the internal auditor’s place in Tampa’s charter.

The commission’s recommendation limits the powers and authority of the IG to what is explicitly stated in the charter language, a restriction not found in other local governments’ charters where the meat of the position is fleshed out in ordinance. However, the commission’s proposal would grant the city council authority to write implementing ordinances that spell out the required professional qualifications, dictate the term of office, provide the mechanism for the IG’s budget and staffing, and ensure whistleblower protections for persons who bring complaints to the office. Among the many other ordinance-level factors the council may have to consider in conjunction with the IG position is whether to change how complaints flow through the existing city bureaucracy should an IG be adopted. Depending on the particular context, some combination of HR, the ethics commission, the internal auditor, and the city attorney currently play a role in the complaint investigation process.

Of course, the commission’s recommendations are just that: suggestions that the council may or may not heed. Both a charter amendment proposal and a fine-tuned ordinance would still have to win the steady support of five out of seven city council members to make it to the ballot, where, ultimately, the voters will decide.

Appendix

• Broward County Inspector General: Charter
• Palm Beach County Inspector General: Charter, Ordinance
• Miami-Dade County Inspector General: Charter, Ordinance
• City of Miami Inspector General: Charter, Ordinance
• City of Miami Beach Inspector General: Charter, Ordinance
• City of Doral: Charter, Ordinance
• City of Tallahassee: Charter, Ordinance
• City of Jacksonville: Charter, Ordinance

Association of Inspectors General

Model Legislation for the establishment of offices of inspector general

The Office of Inspector General is authorized to engage in the following specific functions:

Authority

1. Audit, inspect, evaluate, investigate and inspect the activities, records and individuals with contracts, procurements, grants, agreements, and other financial arrangements undertaken by the (agency), and any other function, activity, process or operation conducted by the (agency).
2. Conduct criminal, civil and administrative investigations.
3. Audit the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the (agency’s) operations and functions and conduct reviews of the (agency’s) performance measurement system.
4. Review of the reliability and validity of the information provided by (agency) performance measures and standards.
5. Provide information and evidence that relates to criminal acts to appropriate law enforcement officials.
6. Initiate such reviews or audits operations of the (agency) as deemed appropriate.
7. Receive and investigate complaints from any source or upon its own initiative concerning alleged abuses, frauds and service deficiencies including deficiencies in the operation and maintenance of facilities.
8. Engage in prevention activities, including but not limited to: review of legislation; review of rules, regulations, policies, procedures, and transactions; training and education.
9. Refer matters for further civil, criminal, and administrative action to appropriate administrative and prosecutorial agencies.
10. Conduct joint investigations and projects with other oversight or law enforcement agencies.
11. Recommend remedial actions to be taken by the (agency) to overcome or correct operating or maintenance deficiencies and inefficiencies that were identified by the Office.
12. Issue public reports as set forth in section 10.
13. Monitor implementation of recommendations made by the Office and other audit agencies.
14. Establish policies and procedures to guide functions and processes conducted by the Office.
15. Attend any meetings held by the (agency).
16. Maintain information regarding the cost of investigations and cooperated with appropriate administrative and prosecutorial agencies in recouping such costs from nongovernmental entities involved in willful misconduct.
17. Do all things necessary to carry out the functions set forth in this section.

The Office of Inspector General is provided the following powers to accomplish the intent of this legislation:

Powers

1. The right to obtain full and unrestricted access to all records, information data, reports, plans, projections, matters, contracts, memoranda, correspondence and any other materials, including electronic data of the (agency) or any other organization that may be involved with the (agency). This power supercedes any claim of privilege.
2. The authority to subpoena witnesses, administer oaths or affirmations, take testimony and compel the production of such books, papers, records and documents, including electronic data as is deemed to be relevant to any inquiry or investigation undertaken pursuant to this writing. This power may be delegated to a duly authorized deputy inspector general by the Inspector General.
3. Have access to the head of any public entity, when necessary for purposes related to the work of the Office.
4. Require public employees to report to the Office of Inspector General information regarding fraud, waste, corruption, illegal acts, and abuse.

For more information on these topics, contact me rcreightoniii@hotmail.com.